

兩岸連鎖加盟產業搭便車現象與績效關係之研究

張怡璘、封德台

E-mail: 9707902@mail.dyu.edu.tw

摘要

面臨物價、裁員率攀升及薪水不變下，越來越多人傾向獨立創業；而大部份加盟產業為小額投資，促使更多創業者參與加盟產業行列，導致加盟產業競爭相當激烈。先前學者討論過加盟者如何篩選加盟總部、加盟總部如何與加盟者維持長久良好關係；本研究主要探討加盟者若存有投機的心態，想藉此加盟產業之聲譽搭便車，加盟總部以集權化、正式化與互動方式是否降低搭便車現象，且降低搭便車現象是否提升公司績效。本研究採便利抽樣及郵寄方式，調查台灣與大陸加盟產業各加盟店之店長。本研究發現，集權化與正式化對搭便車存有明顯的相互關係，所以加盟者為了本身利益因而願意配合加盟總部所訂定的決策方式及法令規章。台灣的加盟者搭便車心態，不會因與加盟總部互動頻率高而降低，但大陸的加盟者則相反；整體來說，雖然加盟者懷有搭便車心態，卻沒有降低公司績效。

關鍵詞：加盟總部，加盟者，集權化，正式化，互動，搭便車

目錄

中文摘要	iii	英文摘要
iv 誌謝辭	v	內容目錄
vi 表目錄	viii	圖目錄
ix 第一章 緒論	1	第一節 研究背景動機
1 第二節 研究問題與目的	3	第三節 研究流程
4 第二章 文獻探討	6	第一節 加盟
6 第二節 搭便車	10	第三節
12 第四節 正式化	14	集權化
16 第六節 公司績效	18	第五節 互動
20 第三章 研究方法	20	第一節 研究架構
20 第二節 研究推論與假設	21	第三節 變數之操作性定義與衡
21 第四節 研究工具	22	第五節 問卷設計
26 第六節 資料分析法	27	第四章 資料分析
30 第一節 基本資料之敘述性統計分析	30	第二節
33 第三節 問卷量表信效度之檢定	35	樣本之敘述性統計分析
37 第五節 獨立T檢定分析	40	第四節 因素分析
42 第七節 實證分析	43	第五章 結論與建議
49 第一節 研究結論與意涵	49	第二節 實務意涵與建議
50 第三節 研究限制	52	第四節 未來研究建議
53 參考文獻	54	附錄A 問卷設計版
65 附錄B 問	67	卷發放版
23 表 3-2	表 3-1 集權化之量表	
24 表	24 表 3-3 互動之量表	
26	表 3-4 搭便車之量表	
26	表 3-5 公司績效之量表	
29 表 4-1 問卷樣本回收情況	29 表 4-2 兩岸基本資料之樣本敘述性統計分析表	
32 表 4-3 兩岸樣本之敘述性統計分析表	32 表 4-4 兩岸各構面調整前之信效度分析表	
35 表 4-5 兩岸各構面調整後之信效度分析表	35 表 4-6 台灣之KMO值與Bartlett球形檢定	
37 表 4-7 大陸之KMO值與Bartlett球形檢定	37 表 4-8 兩岸之因素分析	
39 表 4-9 兩岸獨立T檢定結果	39 表 4-10 台灣相關分析	
42 表 4-11 大陸相關分析	42 表 4-12 台灣迴歸分析	
45 表 4-13 台灣搭便車對公司績效迴歸分析	45 表 4-14 大陸迴歸分析	
47 表 4-15 大陸搭便車對公司績效迴歸分析	48 表 4-16 研究假設驗證表	
48 圖 1-1 研究流程圖		

參考文獻

- 一、中文部分 吳明隆，涂金堂(2006)，SPSS與統計應用分析(2版，pp. 883-927)，台北:五南。二、英文部份 Abanese, R., & Van Fleet, D. (1985). Rational behavior in groups: The free riding. *Academy of Management Review*, 10, 244-255. Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. *American Economic Association*, 62, 777-795. Alon, I. (2001). The use of franchising by U.S. based retailers. *Journal of Small Business Management*, 39, 111-122. Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Barzel, Y. (1997). Economic analysis of property rights. New York: Cambridge University Press. Baumol, W. J. (1996). Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and distinctive. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 11, 3-22. Boisot, M. H. (1998). Knowledge assets. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brickley, J. A., & Dark, F. H. (1987). The choice of organizational form, the case of franchising. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 18, 27-35. Carner, W. (1987). An analysis of franchising in retail banking. *Journal of Retail Banking*, 8, 57-66. Castrogiovanni, G. J., & Justis, R. T. (1998). Franchising configurations and transitions. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 15, 170-190. Cavaliere, F. (1988). The pros and cons of franchising. *Business Forum*, 13, 11-13. Combs, J. G., & Ketchen, K. J. (1993). Can capital scarcity help agency theory explain franchising? Revisiting the capital scarcity hypothesis. *Academy of Management Journal*, 42, 196-207. Combs, J. G., & Ketchen, K. J. (2003). Why do firms use franchising as an entrepreneurial strategy? A meta-analysis. *Journal of Management*, 29, 443-465. Combs, J. G., Michael, S. C., & Castrogiovanni, G. J. (2004). Franchising: A review and avenues to greater theoretical diversity. *Journal of Management*, 30, 907-931. Dant, R. P., & Gundlach, G. T. (1999). The challenge of autonomy and dependence in franchised channels of distribution. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 14, 35-67. Daws, R. M. (1975). Formal models of dilemmas in social decision making: Human judgment and decision processes (pp. 88-107). New York: Academic Press. Doherty, A. M., & Quinn, B. (1999). International retail franchising: An agency theory perspective. *International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management*, 27, 224-236. Dwyer, F. R., & Oh, Z. (1987). Output sector munificence effects on the internal political-economy. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 24, 347-368. Edney, J. J. (1980). The commons problem: Alternative perspectives. *American Psychologist*, 35, 1-11. Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency and institutional-theory explanations: The case of retail sales compensation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 31, 488-511. Ellram, L. M. (1991). Supply chain management: The industrial organization perspective. *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management*, 21, 13-23. Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114, 817-868. Feldwick, P. (1996). What is brand equity anyway and how do you measure it? *Journal of Market Research*, 38, 85-104. Flood, M. M. (1975). Some experimental games. *Research memorandum RM-789*, California: Rand Corporation. Fulop, C., & Jim, F. (1997). Insight into Franchising: A review of empirical and theoretical perspectives. *The Service Industries Journal*, 17, 603-625. Garg, V. K., & Abdal, A. R. (2003). International multi-unit franchising: An agency theoretic explanation. *International Business Review*, 12, 329-348. Garrette, B., & Quelin, B. (1994). An empirical study of hybrid forms of governance structure: The case of the telecommunications equipment industry. *Research Policy*, 23, 395-412. Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Management Journal*, 35, 191-202. Hall, R. (1989). The management of intellectual assets: A new corporate perspective. *Journal of General Management*, 15, 8-53. Hall, R. (1993). A framework linking intangible resources and capabilities to sustainable competitive advantage. *Strategy Management Journal*, 14, 18-607. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. *Science*, 162, 1243-1248. Hart, O. (1995). Firms, contracts and financial structure. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Heide, J. B., & George, J. (1988). The role of dependence balancing in safeguarding transaction-specific assets in conventional channels. *Journal of Marketing*, 52, 20-35. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of firm: Managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure. *Journal of Finance Economics*, 3, 303-360. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1992). Specific and general knowledge and organizational structure. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 74-251. Jones, G. R. (1984). Task visibility, free riding, and shirking: Explaining the effects of structure and technology on employee behavior. *Academy of Management Review*, 9, 429-456. Jones, G. R. (1987). Franchising as a way to compete against large chains. *Nation's Business*, 75, 25-34. Kaiser, H. (1966). The varimax criterion for analysis rotation in factor analysis. *Psychometrika*, 189. Kidwell, R. E. Jr., & Bennett, N. (1993). Employee propensity to withhold effort: A conceptual model to intersect three avenues of research. *Academy of Management Review*, 18, 429-456. Kidwell, R. E., Nygaard, A., & Silkose, R. (2007). Antecedents and effects of free riding in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 22, 522-544. Klein, B., & Kevin, M. M. (1988). Vertical restraints as contract enforcement mechanisms. *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 31, 265-297. Knoke, D. (1990). Organizing for collective action: The political economies of associations. New York: De Gruyter. Krueger, A. B. (1991). Ownership, agency, and wages: An examination of franchising in the fast food industry. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 106, 75-101. Lal, R. (1990). Improving channel coordination through franchising. *Marketing Science*, 9, 299-318. Latane, B., Williams, K., & Harkins, S. G. (1979). Many hands make light the work: The causes and consequences of social loafing. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 822-832. Litz, R. A., & Stewart, A. C. (1998). Franchising for sustainable advantage? Comparing the performance of independent retailers and trade-name franchises. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 13, 131-150. Luce, R. D., & Ralffia, H. (1957). Games and decision. New York: Wiley. Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1979). Experiments on the provision of public goods: Resources, interest, group size, and the free-rider problem. *American Journal of Sociology*, 84, 1335-1360. Michael, S. C. (1999). Do franchised chains advertise enough? *Journal of Retailing*, 75, 461-478. Michael, S. C. (2000). The effect of organizational

form on quality: The case of franchising. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 43, 295-318. Michael, S. C. (2002). Can a franchise chain coordinate? *Journal of Business Venturing*, 17, 325-341. Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1988). An economic approach to influence activities in organizations. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 295-318. Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1990). Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity (pp. 57-90). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. North, D. C. (1990). Institutions and a transaction-cost theory of exchange (pp. 182-194). UK: Cambridge University Press. Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw Hill.

Oetzel, J. G. (2001). Self-construal, communication processes and group outcomes in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. *Small Group Research*, 32, 19-54. Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Peterson, A., & Dant, R. (1990). Perceived advantage of the franchise option from the franchisee perspective: Empirical insights from a service franchise. *Journal of Small Business Management*, 28, 41-46. Pizanti, I., & Lerner, M. (2003). Examining control and autonomy in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. *International Small Business Journal*, 21, 131-159. Polanyi, M. (1962). Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy. New York: Harper & Raw. Porter, M. (1980). Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors. New York: The Free Press. Quinn, B. (1999). Control and support in an international franchise network. *International Marketing Review*, 16, 345-362. Rokkan, A. I., Heide, J. B., & Wathne, K. H. (2003). Specific investments in marketing relationships: Expropriation and bonding effects. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 40, 210-224. Ross, S. (1973). The Economic theory of agency: The decision making as a political process: The case of a university budget. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 19, 135-151. Rousseau, D. M. (1995). Psychological contracts in organizations: Understanding written and unwritten agreements. Sage Publications, California: Thousand Oaks. Rubin, P. H. (1978). The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 21, 223-233. Sahsi, C. M., & Devi, P. K. (2002). Franchising in global market: Toward a conceptual framework. *International Marketing Review*, 19, 499-524. Schewe, C. D., & Smith, R. M. (1983). Marketing concepts and application. New York: McGraw-Hill. Stroebe, W., & Frey, B. S. (1982). Self-interest and collective action: The economics and psychology of public goods. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 21, 121-137. Telser, L. G. (1960). Why should manufacturers what fair trade? *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3, 85-96. Tuunanen, M., & Hyrsky, K. (2001). Entrepreneurial paradoxes in business format franchising: An empirical survey of Finish franchisees. *International Small Business Journal*, 19(4), 47-62. Van de Ven, A. H. (1976). On the nature, formation, and maintenance of relations among organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, 1, 24-36. Von Hayek, F. A. (1935). The nature and history of the problem. London: Collectivist Economic Planning. Von Hayek, F. A. (1940). Socialist calculation: The competitive solution. *Economica*, 7, 49-125. Watson, G., & Sanderson, J. (1997). Collective good versus private interest: Lean enterprise and the free rider. *Advanced Supply Management*, UK: Earlsgate Press. Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The Free Press. Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic-organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36, 269-296. Windsperger, J. (2004). Centralization of franchising networks: Evidence from the Austrian franchise sector. *Journal of Business Research*, 7, 1361-1369.