

A STUDY OF DIRECTORATE INTERLOCKING AND CONTROLLING-TYPES OF HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY IN TAIWAN - A RESEARCH OF SEMICONDUCTOR I

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ABSTRACT

The semiconductor industry play a significant key role in Taiwan High-tech industry withen every aspect of the industry scale, technical level,the quality of human resource and the international competition degree. As a future vision which so called 「Green sillicon island」 annouced by new government, this paper targets an object of the relationship between the semiconductor companys and the board of directors islandwide. The outlines are as follow: 一、 The ratio of holding stock of the boards will fall after IPO. 二、 The density of the relationship network in the board will fall after IPO. 三、 The chairman of the board,we posit that the ratio of ties based on close and distant kinship relationship will fall. The ratio of ties based on friendship relationships, superior/ subordinate , and investment relationships will increase. 四、 The centralityof the board,s relationship network will increase after IPO. 五、 The scale of the boards will increase after IPO. The research concludes that the semiconductor manufacturing company ' s board of directors ' member has become increasingly professional and non-family members, but it has tightened the binds over the board of directors even more. In the semiconductor industry in Taiwan, although professionals are running a company and have somewhat stable control over the company, it is because that the boss himself possesses the majority or a toral control over the board of directors. Instead of what Chandler (1977) said 「 the extent of separation between ownership and control 」 these semiconductor companies in Taiwan is more like being controlled by boss himself to bind 「 ownership and control 」 even tigher.

Keywords : directorate interlocking ; controlling-types

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